

Intrusion Detection, Deception or Prevention?

David M. Piscitello Core Competence, Inc. mailto:dave@corecom.com "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" *Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard's Almanac*

"People are idiots" Scott Adams, *The Dilbert Principle*

Reactive or Proactive?

If we exerted more effort to secure our systems, we wouldn't have to rely on IDS or Honeynets

The sum of our bad habits

- ...is staggering!
- Shoddy Authentication
 - Limping along (still!) with passwords!
- Liberally defined Access Controls
 - Policies are outsider-focused (Who's an outsider these days?)
 - Reactionary applications of policy to insiders (Orwellian filtering of content)
- Accounting vs. accountability

Policy? Who has time for *Policy?*

- Policy and documentation do not match deployed systems and operating practices
- Pace of security technology change forces implementation without
 - due consideration to its impact,
 - adequate planning and testing, and
 - organizational awareness of its effects
- Policies deteriorate to "what the security technology provides"

But the Most Aggregious Offender Award goes to...

- Lame software (blame the vendor)
 - Features and time to market are more important than security
 - Little attention to (secure) code review
 - Consumers are beta (even alpha) testers
- Lame practices (blame yourself)
 - tolerate of poor software
 - don't apply security patches
 - choose ease of use and availability over security ("Remember password"?)
- I.e., we *all* provide a fertile hunting ground for attackers

Remedies: Software

Keep Software Current

 Majority of successful attacks are perpetrated against commonly known vulnerabilities for which patches, hot fixes or upgrades are available

Know what's running in your shop

 Investigate how new software "behaves" before you put it in production

Remedies: System level/OS

- Vulnerability assessment is proactive
- Scan, identify, then mitigate vulnerabilities
 - Run current software versions, images, builds
 - Apply hot fixes, service and security patches
 - Eliminate unnecessary services
 - Audit routinely
 - Consider system and file system integrity software

Remedies: Perimeter Enforcement

- Outbound is as important as inbound
 - Back-channels, from Adware to Zombies, are evil—block them
- Apply stringent access controls
 - Block all *outbound services*
 - Wait for the phone to ring
 - Require justification for all outgoing connections
 - Routinely check logs for (new) outbound connection attempts to blocked ports

Remedies: Identity and Access Controls

- Implement strong authentication
 - Two or all of:
 - Something you know
 - Something you possess
 - Something you are
 - Trash the Post-It Inventory in your supply closet (along with velcro strips)
- Implement authorization
 - at host and object level

Remedies: (D)DOS prevention

- Prevent source address spoofing
 - Features like Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding block forged packets
- Make it harder for DOS attackers
 - Apply ICMP and multicast flood filters
 - Rate limiting features (e.g., cisco CAR)
 - Selected Packet Discard (SPD) features
- Router neighbor authentication
- See also
 - http://www.sans.org/ddos_roadmap.htm
 - <u>http://www.tisc2001.com/presentations.html</u> (Savage, Hancock presentations, S01, S02)

Remedies: Predictive Analysis

- Maximize your logging and auditing information
- Look for trends that have historical precedence
- Stay abreast of news that affects your industry/sector
- Monitor mail lists that identify exploits and vulnerabilities
 - See Predictive Analysis, by Jeff Stutzman (http://tisc2001.com/insight.html)

Top Ten "Obvious but Often Ignored" Security Practices

- 1. Define a security policy
- 2. Implement what you define
- 3. Make the policy known and enforce it
- 4. Never put default installs into production
- 5. Never allow a new service through your perimeter without analyzing it
- **6**. Review code & scripts before you use them
- 7. Log *everything,* and routinely review what you've logged
- 8. Learn how to gather evidence from audit/log data
- 9. Report incidents to law enforcement agencies10. Prosecute attackers

Conclusion

- Detection and Deception are sexy
- Prevention is mundane and tedious
- Over time, prevention will cost you less and protect you more
 - Let someone else's network be "the low hanging fruit"